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FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
1835-1877. By Bernard Schwartz. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 243. $10.00.

From Confederation to Nation is a constitutional history of the
United States in the nineteenth century. To be more exact, it is an
examination of the operation of the Federal Constitution from 1835
(the year of John Marshall's death) to 1877 (the end of Reconstruc
tion). Although the book is. rather short (only 243 pages, including
index), it is packed with information and analysis. None of the im
portant American constitutional developments of the period is ex
cluded from discussion. The thesis of the book is that between 1835
and 1877 the United States was transformed from a loose confedera
tion with a weak central government into a nation whose central gov
ernment possessed both the military strength to restrain rebellious
states from leaving the Union and the political authority to protect in
dividual rights from abridgment under color of state authority. In
overview, the book is. a successful effort ,to support :this thesis by tra
cing constitutional developments between 1835 and 1877. According
to Professor Schwartz, these developments were so significant, and the
transformation of government so momentous, that "[t]he four decades
after Marshall's death can be considered as a virtual continuing con
stitutional convention . . . ." 1
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

1. B. SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONS1ITU
TION, 1835-1877, at x (1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ].
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Professor Schwartz approaches the progress of the Federal Constitution from two directions. On one hand, he explores constitutional developments within each of the it:hree branches of ,the federal government. On the other, he examines separately the principal constitutional crises of the era: slavery, secession and Civil War, and Reconstruction.
There is little in From Confederation to Nation that is startling or
new. The basic assumptions underlying ithe book are widely held.
These assumptions include: that John Marshall's principal achievement was in laying the legal foundations for the supremacy of the central government; that .the Taney Court, unlike the Marshall Court, elevated the public interest above property rights; that for most of the
period Congress outshone the office of President in terms of power
and prestige; that the military defeat of the Confederacy changed
Marshall's exposition of federal supremacy from a theory to a reality;
and that the efforts of the Radicals and their supporters to secure justice and equality for the ex-slaves failed not simply because of unfavorable decisions by .the Chase Court but also because the nation had
become disenchanted with the Reconstruction program. Thus, the
merit of the book does not lie in the originality of its ideas. Rather,
the book is valuable because, in a brief number of pages, it points
out and analyzes with considerable perspicacity the main constitutional
problems which faced this country between the fourth and eighth decades of the last century. Professor Schwartz' felicitous prose style
is also worthy of mention.
Of the portions of the book on .the development of constitutional litigation in the Supreme Court, the portion exploring the pre-Civil War
Taney Court's expansion of the power of the states is the best. 2 There
is also a good assessment of a little-known but important post-Civil
War decision of the Supreme Court regarding the legality of secession.3
2. At one point, Professor Schwartz notes that the term "police power" came into
vogue as a result of the opinion of the Chief Justice in the License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504 (1847). SCHWAR1Z 15.
3. ScHWAR1Z 133-34, 166-68. The case was Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
700 (1869). In White, an original proceeding for injunctive relief restraining payment
of certain United States bonds owned by the state of Texas prior to the Civil War but
alienated by the Confederate Texas state government, the Chase Court found it necessary to determine the legal effect of Texas' ordinance of secession by which the state
purported to leave the Union in 1861. It was held that the ordinance was a complete
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From Confederation to Nation depicts the office of President as
quite weak during most of the period. There were, according to
Schwartz, only three strong Presidents during the period: Jackson,
who strengthened the office by exercising his power to discharge subordinate executive officers, as well as the veto power; and Polk and
Lincoln, who made extensive use of the President's powers as Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces. It would be difficult to question this assessment of the Presidency.
While Congress was the predominant branch of Government for
most of the period, From Confederation to Nation shows that Congress
was in a state of decline. The immortals-Clay, Webster, Calhoun,
Benton-were surrounded by a mass of venal, gross, half-witted fellow
legislators. Brawls and drinking bouts on the floor were not uncommon.
I found the chapters on the Dred Scott case,4 the Civil War,5 and
Reconstruction6 to be the most interesting of the book. In view of
the ever-burgeoning Watergate scandal, i!:he materials in the book on
executive privilege, 7 the President's power il:o discharge subordinates, 8 and the impeachment of Andrew Johnson9 are highly relevant.
Fianlly, two criticisms are in order. Early in the book Schwartz
quotes from Jackson's message which vetoed the rechartering of the
Bank of the United States-a message perhaps authored by Taneyand then describes the quoted language10 as "comparable to the neganullity, "utterly without operation in law." Id. at 726. The Court reasoned that once
Texas joined the Union it lost the power ever to withdraw:
When . . . Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties
of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The
act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more
than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political
body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was
as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except
through revolution, or through consent of the States.
Id.
4. ScHWAR1Z 107-30.
5. Id. at 131-59.
6. Id. at 160-216.
7. Id. at 71-74.
8. Id. at 44-46.
9. Id. at 174-79.
10. [E]very man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws
undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions,
to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and
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tive version of the [equal protection clause] which was adopted over
thirty-five years later." 11 It is arguable that this linking of the 1832
message and the 1868 amendment is simplistic. Jackson clearly was
referring to ·the dangers posed to a representative governmental system
by huge concentrations of private wealth seeking governmental favors;
the language of the fourteenth amendment, on the other hand, was
directed at protecting the rights of the freedmen. Also, Schwartz
views the decision of Luther v. Borden12 by the Taney Court as an
application of ,the judicial doctrine of self-restraint, which involves a
recognition ithat courts cannot resolve political questions:. Actually,
the decision was less a deference to other political institutions than
a manifestation of the federal judiciary's hostility to the legitimate
political grievances of the Dorr movement.13
DONALD E. WILKES, JR.*

the potent more powerful, the humble members of society-the farmers, me
chanics, and laborers-who have neither the time nor the means of securing
like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their
government. . . . If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as
Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the
rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing.
Quoted in id. at 8.
11. ScHWAR'IZ 8.
12. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
13. See Schuchman, The Political Background of the Political-Question Doctrine:
The Judges and the Dorr War, 16 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 111 (1972).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.

